I grew up in Wyoming and my interest in environmental economics stems from three distinct tensions between the environment and the economy of Wyoming. The first was that many people in my town made their living from extracting coal. The second was controversy over the “let it burn” policy during the severe wildfire in Yellowstone in 1988. And the third was the controversy over reintroduction of the gray wolf into Yellowstone which is the focus of this week’s blog.
Reintroduction of the gray wolf began in 1995, but the original proposals date from the mid-1980s (when I was in high school and many of you weren’t born—yes, I’m that old). 66 gray wolves were reintroduced in 1995.[i] The Fish and Wildlife Service originally set a goal of 150 wolves with 15 breeding pairs.[ii] By 2007 the wolf population in the greater Yellowstone area had reached 1,513.[iii] The Fish and Wildlife service recommended that the wolf be delisted from the set of species protected under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in Idaho and Montana, but retain federal protection in Wyoming. Conservationist balked and took to the courts, where Judge Donald Malloy (U.S. District Court, Missoula, MT) held that the species had to be listed under the ESA in all states or in none.[iv] In the end, Congress added a rider to a budget bill that delisted the wolf in Idaho and Montana and Judge Malloy upheld that congressional action.[v] Game-Set-Match.
A similar struggle is currently underway with respect to delisting the grizzly bear. Fish and Wildlife recommended the bear be delisted, and it was actually delisted from 2007-2009.[vi] But conservation groups again headed to court and won a partial victory. Judge Malloy (same judge) determined that Fish and Wildlife hadn’t adequately studied the potential effects of a decrease in white pine bark on the grizzly bear or established a sufficient recovery plan if the bear population should decline rapidly.[vii] On November 22, 2011, the appeals court upheld Judge Malloy’s ruling.[viii] So the grizzly bear is back on the endangered species list awaiting further review by Fish and Wildlife or further congressional shenanigans.
The striking similarity in these two cases suggests the debate is not over the science of endangerment; over whether the decrease in the white pine bark will really endanger the grizzly bear. This is a battle over control. As long as the gray wolf or the grizzly bear are listed under the ESA, their management is under federal control. If they are delisted, management returns to the states. And these are RED states. Conservationists feel as though state management plans will not reflect their values and will lean to heavily toward ranchers’ preferences. Indeed, since delisting the wolf, Montana and Idaho have introduced hunting licenses for wolves, which sold out quickly.[ix]
Economics can help here because it presents an alternative mechanism for the conservationists and the ranchers to reach mutually beneficial agreements. Ranchers have always been compensated for cattle whose death can be linked to wolves. Some ranchers argue that the value of the lost cattle doesn’t capture the full cost of the wolves on cattle populations.[x] But a market-based solution to this problem could go much further than compensation for cattle losses.
Imagine you give hunting permits for wolves to ranchers as a function of the historical number of cattle lost to wolves. Then ranchers can sell or buy additional “kill licenses,” they can even sell them to (gasp) conservationists. The rancher places some value on that kill license, based on the expected damages from one wolf. Conservationists place a value on the license too which is based on the value they have for one additional wolf surviving. Let the market sort out who values the wolf more. Could it be any worse than Congress?
[i] Kaufman, Leslie November 4, 2011.“After Years of Conflict, a New Dynamic in Wolf Country,” New York Times. Available at: http://nyti.ms/tYsGWW. Last accessed November 29, 2011.
[ii] ibid
[iii] ibid
[iv] Remillard, Ashley J. March 22, 2011. “Settlement Reached to Delist the Gray Wolf.” Endangered Species Law and Policy. Available at: http://bit.ly/sBrqrl. Last accessed: November 28, 2011.
[v] Remillard, Ashley J. August 5. 2011. “Federal Judge Upholds Legislation Delisting the Gray Wolf.” Endangered Species Law and Policy. Available at: http://bit.ly/sQYLmo. Last Accessed: November 28, 2011.
[vi] Kaufman, Leslie. November 8, 2011. “How is a Grizzly Bear Like a Wolf?” New York Times Green Blog. Available at: http://nyti.ms/uH4BXt. Last accessed: November 28, 2011.
[vii] ibid
[viii] Huang, Audrey. November 22, 2011. “Ninth Circuit Affirms Lower Court Decision for Strike Rule Delisting Grizzly Bears” Endangered Species Law and Policy. Available at: http://bit.ly/utNmAO. Last accessed: November 28, 2011.
[ix] Kaufman, Leslie November 4, 2011.“After Years of Conflict, a New Dynamic in Wolf Country,” New York Times. Available at: http://nyti.ms/tYsGWW. Last accessed: November 28, 2011.
[x] Lutey, Tom May 23, 2011. “Wolves killing fewer cattle in Wyoming than in Montana, Idaho” Billings Gazette. Available at: http://bit.ly/lafo2f. Last accessed: November 28, 2011.
I agree that letting the free-market regulate endangered species and their protection is overall a viable solution. The main problem that is to be had in the mix of all of this, however, is the lack of education or care of ranchers towards the species which are threatening their livestock. Ranchers are going to shot wolves and bear whether or not they are endangered. They are going to shot them whether to not they have a permit. They will likely only buy the permits in a free-market system to make it appear as if they are obeying the law.
It would be seemingly impossible to track and monitor all of the endangered wolves and bears in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho. But if such a system were possible, perhaps it would be best to allow ranchers to freely kill whatever species they want, whenever they want, as long as they report their kills. If an individual “disappears”, it can be assumed that it has either been killed or died of natural causes. For each kill made by the rancher, there should be a system of payment, say $10,000 for the first wolf, $25,000 for the next, etc. This way, ranchers can still feel as if they are protecting their land but they are also responsible for protecting the endangered species upon their land since the cost of killing them would be far greater than the cost of lost property they cause.
This is a grandiose solution to a problem which has seemingly occurred since the beginning of husbandry thousands of years ago.
Nope. It couldn’t be any worse. It might actually work. However, I would implement this if the wolf was taken off the ESA, since the statute prohibits the ‘taking’ of endangered species (although there might be some problems with enforcement, as always).
I guess the real question would be at what price should the permits be sold. Would it be at the average cost of lost cattle per wolf to the ranchers? For this permit price, we might want to take into account the actual benefits per wolf for the environment/ecosystem. The wolf doesn’t only kill cattle, but also balances a huge part of that region’s ecosystem, which I think is pretty important. But then, what about non-use values? How would, for example, a WTP for each wolf being alive affect the price? Who should be included in this analysis? The permits might help to internalize these costs; but the price we put on each animal (permit) is just as important if we want this to work, and that’s the point where things start getting complicated. Get a high WTP or use value for the wolf, and the RED states won’t go for it. Estimate a low price, and the wolf population might be worse off than under the ESA. I have to say, this would make for an awesome MP (I’M CALLING IT, RIGHT MEOW!).
Besides, the wolf is my favorite animal. If it was for me, I would just keep paying them for their cattle. The wolf was there first. 😛
This reminds me of the time I discussed Coase Theorem with my undergraduate academic advisor. Coase theorem states that when there are clearly defined property rights and negligible transaction costs, two parties will reach an economically efficient decision. Alas, wolves probably care little about property rights and more about getting some tasty cow in their stomachs. So, Coase theorem, as does a fair amount of theory, doesn`t apply in real life situations as nicely as the theory would dictate.
I think that Daniel`s potential solution of using an exponential or nearly exponential marginal cost system is interesting. However, good luck trying to convince a rancher to pay increasing amounts of money to kill additional wolves. Also, some ranchers would be at more of a disadvantage due to the fact that wolves may be more densely populated near their ranch, but less densely populated at their theoretical neighbor`s ranch.
Another issue that may be present is the idea that conservationists (the people who are doing the bargaining for the wolves) do not have control over the wolves. Regardless of decisions made, wolves are going to do what wolves do. In seriousness, how are you going to incentivize wolves to not eat cattle (besides killing them)? Tax them? Good luck with that…
It would seem to me that the ranchers have a clearer price signal indicating the value of not having any wolves — ie. more productive cattle ranching. It’s not clear that conservationists per sea have a similar price signal due to free rider and externalities inherent in the wolf’s existence or role in the ecosystem. This makes it hard to get to the marginally equivalent equilibrium. Further, a cynic might point out that selling wolf permits might become idealogical which does nothing to satisfy either side.
In order to use economics as an environmental tool, we should be setting either the price or the quantity to get to an efficient or an environmental level (i.e. Pigouvian tax corrects externalities, set the cap for pollution at a level that is good for the environment or health). In the case of the grey wolves permit, neither of these would be true. Giving out permits as a function of historical kill levels will neither bring about efficiency or create some environmentally sustainable level. Also, I think this idea has too much potential for corruption, as well as monitoring costs. Will FWS need to go to every farm and verify every head of cattle lost to a wolf? In addition, ranchers may be tempted to inflate losses to gain permits.
Overall, listing a species under ESA means that the government is now incurring some cost to conserve them apart from economic concerns or efficiency. I don’t think markets should be at play in deciding how many wolves we hunt.
This strategy sounds good in theory but it assumes that ranchers will only kill the number of wolves they have permits for. This is doubtful as even when the wolves were protected by the ESA they faced hunting pressure. Fear and loathing of carnivores is a deeply ingrained cultural prejudice that incites very visceral reactions from people. Many people, especially those who make their living from livestock, see any sort of large predator as a pest and believe they are doing a service by shooting them on sight. It’s a belief based strongly in emotion and cultural attitudes, i.e., not rational and not easily influenced by economic instruments.
My MP is focused on evaluating conservation interventions for big cats, particularly ones related to human-wildlife conflict and I’d think that many of my conclusions hold true for wolves as well. It is very hard to get people to stop killing predators such as lions, even when they are compensated for lost livestock. One of the few successful strategies to stop retaliatory killing is to simply build better fences to protect the livestock at night, when predators are most likely to attack. It can drastically reduce the number of livestock killed and therefore the retaliation. However, even when strategies such as these lead to significant reductions in livestock predation, they can fail at reducing persecution unless they include significant education and outreach to the local people.
Because cultural attitudes against predators are so strongly ingrained, even preventing all livestock predation completely would not be enough to stop their persecution. No matter how many permit programs or compensation schemes you implement ranchers will keep killing predators, whether legally permitted or not, as most people brought up in a ranching society have an ingrained distrust of predators that doesn’t go away even if the livestock predation does. This means that every human-wildlife conflict mitigation strategy needs to include an education component. If ranchers can be shown the value the carnivore has to its ecosystem and the people who live in it they will be less likely to persecute them. A truly successful intervention strategy therefore will include education as a complement to other methods such as compensation/insurance, permits, fencing, or improved herding practices.
I love a good market solution, but I see enforcement as a huge potential stumbling block with this one. I’m sure there are plenty of nice red-state ranchers, but do I seriously think they’re going to report all (or even close to all) of their wolf kills? NO WAY. They’re going to shoot every wolf that comes anywhere near their property, and no one will be the wiser. I don’t see any way to enforce a permit system out in the middle of nowhere (sorry Lori – I’m sure it was really nice where you grew up).
I also have to say that I’m uncomfortable in principle with the notion of allowing the hunting of a federally listed endangered species. It undercuts the objectives of our most important wildlife conservation law, and more importantly, it could be a slippery slope at a time when there are a lot of red state politicians who would love to see the ESA go the way of the dodo.
In theory, wolf permits sounds like a great idea and definitely couldn’t be much worse than how the current policy makers are handing the situation. On the other hand, in practice I could see some potential issues and complications in the implementation process, particularly around allocation and pricing of the permits. I would definitely be skeptical that it would actually work. The other concern that I have, which was mentioned above is putting in place a permitting system may not get at the actual root of the problem which is the lack of understanding of the role that wolves play in the ecosystem and without a top predator like the wolf, the ecosystem will be imbalanced. There needs to be more education of the ranchers and the associated policy makers about the importance of the wolves not only to the ecosystem but to the ranchers as well. The education needs to be relevant to stakeholders so they see the value in the wolves and the stability of the ecosystem. They need to understand they are dependent on the land and unless the land is healthy it will not provide the resources that they need to be prosperous (at least not for very long).
I cannot understand why ranchers should be issued hunting permit only if their cows were eaten by wolves. The damage caused by wolves is not limited to the death of cows. Everyone could announce a loss cause of the existence of wolves. (If something has an existing value, it should have an existing loss as well). Therefore, I think giving ranchers permit is irrational and unfair.
Additionally, the political feasibility is doubted. Similar to USA refused to compensate their carbon emission since Industry revolution as European countries did in Kyoto protocol, USA government may not uphold a plan to compensate the potential and historical loss of ranchers.
This has the possibility of working. Seeing as though in some instances under the ESA there are permitted takes, this seems very similar. We assume with the market based system that we will reach an equilibrium where both sides of the argument are happy. The problem with that is once we figure out what that level will be, are both sides truly satisfied with the out comes? Can we say this is the economically efficient amount of wolves that need to be killed? With permitted take under the ESA, a baseline is set and agreed upon which can not be changed and which both parties have to agree to accept because they have no choice in this matter.
So basically, Coase wins this one. A classic example of the importance of allocating property rights comes from Kenya and runs along similar lines: Elephant herds were collapsing some decades ago (I’m not a details person, sorry), despite the governments best efforts to stop poaching. As it happened, the elephant was also a protected species ‘owned by no one’, so no one had any incentive to protect, but all the poor local tribes had plenty of incentive to kill it (ivory, anyone?).
Eventually somebody got the smart idea to do the appalling thing of *giving ownership of the elephant*- yes, giving ownership of the sacred, mighty elephant- to local tribes and townships. Local authorities could kill the elephant or preserve it, as they saw fit, and were fully legally allowed to profit from those activities.
So what happened? In a matter of years, the elephant herd went from brink of collapse to 16,000+, as the people poaching the elephant for a living were now managing the herds for a living, fighting off poachers, selling the occasional kill, and making a killing on the side from tourists of all sorts.
Yes, some elephants are killed by hunters who pay big money for the sport. Despise them if you will. But at the end of the day, they is the very small price for saving the whole species (or at least the one that lives in Kenya).
The real threat to the wolves then becomes this: how much does America value the wolf at all? If no body cares if the last wolf is killed and no body values a good wolf hide, the wolf has no value to the ranchers other than dead meat not killing their cattle. In short, so long as ranchers see profit in keeping the wolves around- no matter the means- they will. A market solution might well be had. I love wolves and I can live with that if it means they stay wild.
While I’m all for economic solutions to environmental problems in many situations, I’m not sure how I feel about comparing a market of permits for killing an endangered species to a market of permits for pollution. With the pollution permits, the permits serve as a way to control how much pollution is emitted into the environment. But what if a firm emits pollution without a permit? They’ll hopefully be caught and then fined, and while in some sense the damage that they’ve done is long-lasting, it’s not as if one firm polluting without a permit could cause catastrophic damage to the environment. However, with permits for hunting wolves, it’s possible that the wolves could be overhunted. If just a handful of ranchers who didn’t have permits hunted wolves anyway, I feel like it’s a much more difficult situation to rectify if the numbers of wolves fall too low as opposed to the amount of illegal pollution from a handful of firms. Sure, people will hunt the wolves illegally even if there weren’t permits, but I feel like allowing permits might make those who would hunt the wolf illegally more likely to do so.
My biggest concern is: would the conservationist have a fair shot at the permits? Ranchers are a less diverse group, and historically have more money to throw around than the plethora of small conservation groups…and while the ranchers shouldn’t be punished for being more organized, correctly estimating the value to society via this method seems precarious, indeed. Again, if you had two groups – ranchers, and conservationists – perfectly organized, this could work, but if the conservationists can’t manage to pool their money effectively there’s still a theoretical loss.
Contrary to what Anthony said, my understanding is that ranchers are not a particularly organized group, nor are they necessarily wealthy. Much like farmers, they tend to be fairly independent (kind of eccentric) fringe folks. Although there are certainly some big ranches, my impression is that most of the ranchers have small operations. It seems to me that conservationists are wealthier and better organized, and this is the reason this system might work- ranchers might be more in need of the money. Since the conservationists appreciate the existence value of the wolf, they might be more willing and able to pay for it.
On the other hand, if ranchers are already indignant about wolves infringing upon what they see as their territory, and are killing them of their own accord, I highly doubt they’d pay much attention to regulation that tells them they must pay to do what they’ve always been doing,
However, the idea of kill permits seems inherently morally wrong to me. As others have mentioned, it is a slippery slope to send the message it is okay to kill wolves. Maybe this is a little too sentimental of me, but it seems wrong to give someone a license to kill a living thing simply because they paid for it. We do this in a more indirect way by buying hunting permits, but that’s also paying a price for the recreational activity of hunting, whereas this is more directly pricing the life of the animal and actually paying for its extermination. This seems to be a very human-centric activity, to me- the wolf is worth this much to US, so we have the right to kill it for that amount. This is ignoring what it is worth to other animals- those in their ecosystem who depend on them. I’m sure we’re not capturing the full existence value of these wolve.s
Even thought I agree that economics seems like a better way to come to a mutally beneficial condition, considering how the fishery policy works in United States, I doubt the permit policy on hunting wolves can work out. It will come to the same question, for ranchers who live in yellowstone area, hunting wolves is not only about compensate the loss of cows. But in some aspects, there exsiting some hastile between ranchers and wolves. And also rancher hunt them for the safty of their young kids,too. Sometimes it is more culture things.
Besides, it is hard to set up the initial permit to different ranch owner, too. Since there might not existing specic record of how much the ranch loss because of the existence of wolves. Not only the loss from direct death from wolves, but also the threaten from wolves limit the active area of cattle and sheep which might reduce the source to feed the cattle and sheep. And also, controlling wolves population might also include “free rider” problem.
I agree with those who opposed to killing wolves and as Rachel mentioned above, it seems morally wrong. In my opinion, the endangered species should not be killed even if there would be economic losses to ranchers. I also agree with Abigail that the losses may not be verified. When we really want to protect the endangered species, we should sacrifice some economic benefits although money or society welfare seems important. But in the long run, benefits from biodiversity in the future may far way greater than costs we paid today and the benefits include existence value and amenities we can get from biodiversity.
If killing wolves, in this case, could be forbidden, then the problem would become how to compensate ranchers. Though ranchers lost cattle, they still have cattle which survived. Then what they need to think about is how to maximize the value of cattle they have. It may motivate ranchers to create higher added values on cattle related products and may also help promote new technology of raising cattle.
I’m not sure how I feel about saying that permits to hunt wolves are morally wrong. All hunting permits are basically kill permits, so that argument only works if one is morally opposed to and wants to do away with all recreational hunting (which I am fine with but just wanted to point out that there really isn’t a distinction between the two). And the wolf is no longer an endangered species in Idaho and Montana, (Thanks to a budget rider . . . a whole other can of worms), so this isn’t an issue of allowing takes of an endangered species. This is just any old species (like hunting white-tail deer) as far as the law is concerned in these states.
The main problem I see with the permit is one of ideology. If the permits are given to ranchers who are so fundamentally opposed to wolves on or near their land, they are never going to sell to conservation groups at any price approaching the economic value of the permit. Even if the rancher is in dire financial straights and needs the money, I’m sure they can find another larger commercial ranching operation or another “red state” wealthy type to buy the permit, so they are not forced to sell to conservation groups. The permit system only seems to work if it is auctioned off by the government. Giving the permits to two sides that have such strongly held beliefs will likely undermine the economic incentives the permits are supposed to allow to play out.
Along with the problems of enforcement, there might be issues regarding the monetary value placed on the wolves for the ranchers versus the conservationists.
For the ranchers, this value would be fairly simple, the cost of raising the cattle and profits made from selling the cattle would equate to the value of the wolves’ absence. However, the value for the conservationists would be less intuitive. The wolves likely play an important role in the surrounding ecosystems, so there is value there. They contribute to biodiversity, they effect the land’s vegetation, they control other populations by hunting and perhaps being hunted themselves. There is also intrinsic value for just being life. How could conservationists settle on a number to capture the true value placed on protecting one more wolf? And how would this number relate to the strictly monetary concerns of the ranchers?
This, however, is a conservation concept that has value and could be viable to (partially) satisfy both parties involved. Tradable permits could be a step towards a solution the population struggles in Wyoming.
I think the idea of hunting permits for endangered species lies in a same line of pollution and fishery permits. I agree that the permit system is economically efficient solution in market based management for common goods and resources. As the trading the permits for pollution and fishery, the hunting permits could work because there might be different marginal costs among hunters if the permits are distributed to hunters by historical numbers of cattle lost by wolves. However we should think the tradable permits have critical drawback that market transaction costs appear lower than expectation. And the prices disperse over time and it becomes not feasible to control pollution or catching amount. I think the hunting permits would be great idea in theoretical sense, but in terms of protecting endangered species the permits for hunting will not work. It can not control to reduce killing but increase number of hunting endangered species. Because the tradable permit prices would not be so higher than expectation as usual and lower permit prices would allow for hunters to kill more endangered species.
First and foremost, I feel very wary of taking of a species off the endangered species list. I think it’s fantastic that F&WS felt comfortable doing so, but I’d agree with Malloy for holding that a species should be endangered in all states. I could even stretch this to say that a species has to been listed in all states that share borders, with the assumption that there could be a population doing quite well in another part of the country. After all, what wild animal has ever obeyed that state line?
The idea of tradable hunting licenses is an intriguing solution. I’d love to see it in action, however, if it wasn’t effective, it could have deleterious impacts on the wolf population and we don’t have a whole lot of room for trial and error. It would be a shame to see a significant decline in population, after all the efforts that have been made to increase it. Since it’s a lot easier to monitor the pollution level of our widget plants and whether or not they have the correct amount of permits, I do wonder about this as a real solution. Enforcement is always a significant issue when it comes to protecting species and habitats. There is really nothing to stop hunters from independently taking their own quotas. It almost seems like too much work for the ranchers/hunters. Now they have to obtain a permit, decided if they want to buy or sell, then determine if they’ve harvested the appropriate number of wolves. Let’s say there is a quota for taking thirty wolves. If an individual spends a day monitoring his/her property and on the way back to the individual’s home, s/he come across the 31st wolf, there seems a very slim chance that the individual will keep walking. I believe that if an economic solution is proposed for this issue, it is imperative that it’s set up so that there are either more incentives for hunters to follow the regulations or it’s easy for the hunters to trade/obtain permits. The bottom line is that people are not going to want to go out of their way when all they have to do is pop out the back door to protect their livestock.
Finally, as always, a little education can go a long way. I wonder if these communities have been made aware of the important roles top predators play in an ecosystem…..
I think the two distinctions Erin made are very important ones, these “kill permits” are basically hunting permits, and although wolves are majestic species that play important roles in the ecosystem, they are on the same playing field as all other species that can be legally hunted thanks to their successful recovery. I believe these market permits could be a solution to the jockeying for control of how this species is managed, but again as Erin mentioned the ideology of how the ranchers feel would have to be reconciled. After searching online it seems this issue is already attempting to be addressed by groups such as Keystone Conservation – http://www.keystoneconservation.us/keystone_conservation/ranger-riders.html – This group recognizes that the return of the wolves to the northern Rockies is a major conservation success story, but that it’s had a negative effect on ranchers. This group works to decrease “wolf-livestock conflicts by providing ranchers information on predator presence and encouraging community monitoring of predators.” One rancher was quoted saying “We realize the wolves are here to stay and we’ve got to find a way to operate under these conditions.” Conservation management requires balance and instituting these permits and furthering education about wolves’ importance in the ecosystem might provide a way we can ensure the longevity of this species and the livelihood of ranchers in the area.
In this assumption I believe the market will tell the true value of these wolves. The design of such a “kill” permit sounds like the carbon omission permits. The ranchers buy the permits according to their lost from wolves. If the wolves cause too much lost, ranchers are supposed to pay much on the permits. Or they will sell the permits to others.
Among the ranchers, this mechanism allocates permits to the ranchers who suffer large loss by the wolves and it is more flexible than just allow or forbid hunting. I suggest there should be a cap in these permits. That is, the total amount to be killed according to the scientists. The problems to be concerned are in what time of year ranchers can hunt or what’s the age or gender in wolves population should be protected. These things can make the permits much more complicated.
However, we have introduced a third party who are the conservationists. The conservationists’ value funtion is different from the ranchers. If they take part in this market, I am afraid that the value of permits are giong to be unreasonable. Further more, if I was the conservationist I would not agree with this permit to “kill” life. I would spend the money on permits in lobbying to win this game. So if we really try to issue permits the implementation is questionable.
As a lot of people mentioned, I see a market-based solution as the best one. Putting a monetary value to environmental goods and services can promote conservation of natural resources or reduce degradation or pollution. As with almost all activities we do, hunters also value being able to hunt, either for leisure or for other reasons, and they do give a value to this activity (some give a monetary value, while others get utility from doing it). So, why not put a price on this activity? But, what would the right price be? This is what I think is one important challenge. In this case, it is difficult to measure all the benefits that wolves provide, directly or indirectly. And also, how would the conservationists agree on the “price of wolves”? While economists could have tons of good reasons to give a value to the animal, many conservationists would probably not accept that value, claiming that animals should not be traded as other goods.
Regardless of the difficulty of putting a price to hunting wolves, I see this alternative as the best one to ensure compliance. While it is also a challenge, getting an economic benefit from this kind of policy provides people with incentives to preserve, and most importantly: makes people aware that nature has a value and that by not considering it we lose important and valuable things.
While it sounds good in theory, the market price for the permits is unlikely to capture the wolf’s value as the apex predator in the local ecosystem. If such value were incorporated into the price, the value would likely be such that ranchers would prefer to sell them all, and the government would have to make a market in the permits to ensure sales at that price. We’re now back to the government paying the rancher directly, so we might at well stick to the more direct payment for damages incurred (perhaps priced more equitably that simply the market value of killed cattle).
Like some of my classmates, I feel giving ranchers permits to kill an endangered species does not send the right message nor get to the heart of the problem. The disconnect between ranchers, wolves, and conservationists is pretty blatant here. Using a market- based approach, allowing permits to be bought and sold to manage the problem, only widens the gap. I think each player in this situation (including the wolves) have different values on totally different scales, so comparing them is tricky. I’m sure we could do the math and find one wolf to be worth just as much alive as it is dead. I also agree with the assumption that having permits will not stop a rancher from killing more than her/his allotted amount of wolves. Enforcement will be difficult.
Though it has already been said, I’d like to reiterate that education is key in a situation like this. Ranchers should understand the way wolves work. Shooting one wolf will not deter others. Pups will learn from their parents where to hunt and what to go after. Ranchers might need to learn how to make more effective fences and how to try to discourage wolves from preying on their stock. Using money to compensate ranchers for stock killed by wolves is a waste. Maybe put the money into some type of outreach plan or an alternative to deal with the over population of wolves. What about birth control? It has worked on wild horses and burros in the past (not perfectly and can be improved upon). Why not wolves? The ranchers would be good sources for conservationists when trying to track packs.
The pro and cons of hunting permission of wolf should be evaluated based on the sustainability of the eco-system rather than focusing on the temporary loss of the minorities —- here, the ranchers
The merely reduction in wolf number couldn’t be the final solution to reduce rancher’s loss.
Instead the hunting permission hinted that dangerous species (notice it’s not endangered species in ESA definition, but the ones that threaten the life of cattle),whatever it is, should be killed.
It actually excuse farmers from equipping their ranches with effective and defensive fence that could directly lead to less harm to the cattle.
As mentioned in the blog, the” killing license” within which the value of species being added, is quite popular among ranchers as it is a kind of compensation.
I’m wondering the money gained by this mechanism could really reflect the loss of eco-system, The problem may come up as to how to monitor ranchers to make sure that they don’t kill more than the allotted.
Finally, the wolf might be listed on the ESA as endangered species again and the cost to reproduce /protect them from distinction is even higher than the benefit gained by ranchers and regulators as a whole.
The market based approach that Lori mentioned would be an interesting experiment and possibly provide a better approach to determining the true value of the wolf. Ranchers contend that compensation of cattle losses due to wolf predation did not account for total costs and other unquantifiable negative externalities. Maybe this value will be teased out through the buying/selling of additional permits. Unfortunately, the conservationists’ willingness to pay will never match their own valuations of total benefits gained from keeping wolf populations at healthy levels. The idea of trophic cascades and ecosystem collapse due to loss of apex predators is no longer in question. Is the value of a wolf quantifiable? If so, would it be valued in the tens of thousands, million, or more dollars? Probably depends on the current population strength, but likely trends towards the higher-order magnitudes. I expect that as carbon markets, and eventually general ecosystem service markets, begin to develop that it will be possible to calculate a closer approximation total benefits from such animals like grey wolves and grizzly bears. Whether conservationists buy permits or ranchers do, it seems likely that the final price will bend in favor of the ranchers.
Though not mentioned in this blog, I would like to know what the average yearly profits are from a cattle operation in these states as well as what the average damages in $$ are for loss of cattle due to the occasional wolf. Either way, monitoring efforts should continue to determine whether population decline will occur in a serious manner. It appears the sensitivities of newer populations are undetermined. There is no reason to go on a roller coast ride of listing and de-listing these animals after their importance became so famous and recognized.
Using a permit system to reach some satisfactory level of wolf populations worries me for the reasons that everyone has pointed out above, and also because of what Lori states in the last sentence of her post “Let the market sort out who values the wolf more.” Would the economically efficient level of wolves really be the ecologically efficient level of wolves? Using a permit system for carbon emissions seems reasonable, because the regulating body can lower total emission total allowable emission levels over time to get closer and closer to the desired state. With the case of wolves, it isn’t as clear-cut (i.e. less carbon = GOOD, more or less wolves = ??). For wolves, it is much less likely that the economically efficient level may match up with ecologically desirable level.
And is there no way to build better fences to keep the wolves out? I am sure the ranchers have already thought of this, but it seems like someone could figure out a way to keep the wolves away without killing them…and that maybe the cost of building and maintaining fences may be more economically efficient than administering and monitoring the permit system, or dealing with the constant battles between conservationists and ranchers…
When I was driving cross-country to come to Duke I spent quite a bit of time in Montana and also down in Yellowstone, and I got to have some really interesting conversations with locals about the wolf population. From what I was told, ranchers are interpreting the protection efforts for the wolf meaning that the government cares more about the wolves than their livelihood. I think that this type of permit system would possibly ease those feelings. By trading permits with conservation groups, the ranchers are getting paid not to hunt and so receiving monetary benefit on top of any compensation for slaughtered cattle. As long as the total number of permits was based on sound science as to a viable wolf population, and the total was non-static and adjusted frequently to reflect instances of cattle death, number of kills, population size, etc this could be a positive tool and compromise for both sides.
I worked for two summers in Wyoming, and having seen the sheer
If a wolf is killing livestock, it probably is having a hard time finding food elsewhere. This would suggest that wolf numbers have grown beyond the capacity of natural prey sources, mostly deer and elk. Tightening restrictions on deer and elk hunting will be very unpopular in these states, as they attract trophy hunters from around the country who pay a lot to kill their animal. Thus, if it is not possible to somehow boost prey numbers to satisfy the needs of the wolf population so that wolf/livestock interactions decrease, the solution lies in a smaller wolf population. If such a permit system was enacted, I feel that well funded conservation groups would buy up permits and that the market would give us a wolf population higher than ecologically desired. A cap on permit price could keep the bidding low and put more permits in the hands of ranchers to ensure a wolf population that is living within its means.
oops disregard the first sentence
A markets solution for endangered species management? Hmm… I’m not sure the big issue here is money, though. Ranchers certainly lose some amount of money through depredation by wolves, but I doubt it’s as significant as one may guess. Add to that the fact that better livestock practices (fencing, guard dogs, etc.) may very well reduce this loss to almost zero. Why then should we be paying ranchers? If a rancher chooses to pasture their cattle in an area where wolves might attack, that is a decision they make with the potential for loss. As such, offering insurance against this loss may be more reasonable than compensation. Because this species was recently reintroduced, I think we easily forget that it is a natural component of the system. Perhaps we should stop coddling ranchers and instead educate them on how best to avoid wolf conflict in their area, on their own dime.
At the first glance of this blog, I really like the hunting permit of gray wolves because it applies the marketing tools into species conservations. And it seems that the market can help to find a balance between the ranchers and conservationists because ranchers can buy or sell the hunting permits according to their loss of cattle, and the conservationists can also enter the market to buy or sell the hunting according to the marginal value of having an extra wolf. Once the marginal value of having an extra wolf equals to the price the conservationists pay, and the marginal loss of cattle per wolf equals to the price the ranchers pays for the permit, the market might get an equilibrium.
However, with a close inspection, I put a doubt on the feasibility of this permit system. First, since it is some kind of free-rider problem, I wonder who is really willing to pay to kill the certain species. For ranchers, reducing the number of wolves cannot only benefit the one who buys the kill permit but also other ranchers. Therefore, in reality, many ranchers might hope others to buy more killing permits instead of buying them by themselves. Besides, even if everyone knows there might be a huge potential damage caused by the extinction of one species, such as gray wolf, in the eco-system, few people want to pay for protecting the species since they might predict others buy the killing permits. Furthermore, here conservationists are those who try their best to estimate the true value of having gray wolves but not the ones who can afford to pay for buying permits to protect the species. Since the value of having gray wolves comes from the whole social willing-to-pay, we cannot also predict that the conservationists afford to buy the amount of permits they expect to.
To sum up, although the hunting permit seems to be an ideal solution, we will meet with many complex problems when implementing the permit system. It might be easier to use a controlling method to protect the species such as forbidding the killing of wolves in special time in a year.
This is an interesting idea – and although I share some of my colleagues’ concerns (Elspeth, Keith, etc) on additional hunting and enforcement – I think it would be an interesting program to pilot.
There would need to be a cap on “kill licenses” (so that it is like a cap-and-trade system for wolf hunting). This way, the pricing of permits can lead to an economically efficient equilibrium, benefiting both the ranchers and conservationists – and we would only have to worry about effective allocation that safeguards environmental integrity (on top of addressing non-permit hunting and enforcement, of course).
Although it could end up being a very expensive conservation approach, I think shifting economic responsibility for wolves away from ranchers and toward wolf supporters (conservationists) could create broader public acceptance for wolf recovery and perhaps help pave the way for sustainable carnivore populations moving forward.
While I think that generally it is great to create an economically based solution that lets the market sort itself out, I think there could be a big problem with enforcement with the proposal for kill permits for wolves that can be sold or traded. Such a free-market would be similar to the concept of pollution permits that firms can buy and sell to one another. However, because firms have to report all of their emissions to a regulatory body and follow strict instructions, there is control over the actual end use of the permits. Thus, if a firm over-emits it will, most likely, be discovered, and there will be consequences. However, in the situation with the wolves, the permits would be traded amongst ranchers, conservationist, and anyone else who may want to buy one, but there would be no well-established regulatory agency that monitors the situation to ensure that the number of wolves killed matches, or is less than, the number of permits given out. As a result, I think that there would be a significant possibility of over-hunting of wolves, and that most likely, they would again become an endangered species.
I like the idea that to let the market “protect” wolves rather than Congress. But I think that there maybe some problems in practice. One problem is that, like someone said, how much should the permit be priced? How much permit should be issued? If there an effective system to monitor ranchers shot wolves according to the permit they bought like Keith said? Is there is market solution to calculate how much permit should be issued? Even the price was set at the price lower than the value of one more surviving wolf, is there any other stronger motivation for the conservationist to buy the permit? For the permit of emission we learned in class are transferred in profit-oriented companies, they have money and also buying those permit can reduce their cost. Maybe those conservationist are all from non-profit organization, which is out of the rule of market, also they may not have enough money to buy the permits, even though the price of permit is lover than their value in ecosystem.
This scheme to me seems a more fair way to determine whether the wolf and bear should be protected than the ESA. Under the ESA, these animals are probably chosen largely because of their charisma and appeal to conservationists, but may not actually be threatened, as the ESA does not use economic models to determine which animals make the cut. But if this method is used to protect all of the charismatic animals which aren’t truly endangered and government is left protecting insects, the already shaky support for the ESA could crumble.